Cover: The Effective Hiring Manager, by Mark Horstman

GUIDE FOR MAKING ACUTE
RISK DECISIONS










CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY
of the
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS
New York, NY






Wiley Logo

It is our sincere intention that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) AIChE, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers' officers and directors, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC
American Chemistry Council
ACGIH
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AEGL
Ambient Air Exposure Guidelines
AIChE
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
AIT
Auto Ignition Temperature
API
American Petroleum Institute
ASME
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BMS
Burner Management System
CCA
Cause Consequence Analysis
CEI
Chemical Exposure Index (Dow Chemical)
CFR
Code of Federal Registry
CMA
Chemical Manufacturers Association
CSB
US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CCPS
Center for Chemical Process Safety
CCR
Continuous Catalyst Regeneration
COO
Conduct of Operations
CPI
Chemical Process Industries
DCU
Delayed Coker Unit
DDT
Deflagration to Detonation Transition
DIERS
Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems
ERS
Emergency Relief System
ERPG
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
EPA
US Environmental Protection Agency
FCCU
Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit
F&EI
Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical)
FMEA
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
HAZMAT
Hazardous Materials
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Study
HIRA
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
HTHA
High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
HRA
Human Reliability Analysis
HSE
Health & Safety Executive (UK)
I&E
Instrument and Electrical
IDLH
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
ISD
Inherently Safer Design
IPL
Independent Protection Layer
ISO
International Organization for Standardization
ISOM
Isomerization Unit
ITPM
Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance
LFL
Lower Flammable Limit
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LOPA
Layer of Protection Analysis
LOTO
Lock Out Tag Out
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAIT
Maximum Auto Ignition Temperature
MAWP
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
MCC
Motor Control Center
MEC
Minimum Explosible Concentration
MIE
Minimum Ignition Energy
MOC
Management of Change
MOOC
Management of Organizational Change
MSDS
Material Safety Data Sheet
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDT
Non- Destructive Testing
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NPV
Net Present Value
OCM
Organizational Change Management
OIMS
Operational Integrity Management System (ExxonMobil)
OSHA
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA
Process Hazard Analysis
PLC
Programmable Logic Controllers
PRA
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PRD
Pressure Relief Device
PRV
Pressure Relief Valve
PSB
Process Safety Beacon
PSE
Process Safety Event
PSI
Process Safety Information
PSI
Process Safety Incident
PSM
Process Safety Management
PSO
Process Safety Officer
PSSR
Pre-Startup Safety Review
QRA
Quantitative Risk Analysis
RBPS
Risk Based Process Safety
RAGAGEP
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice
RMP
Risk Management Plan
SACHE
Safety and Chemical Engineering Education
SCAI
Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks
SHE
Safety, Health and Environmental
SHIB
Safety Hazard Information Bulletin
SIS
Safety Instrumented Systems
SME
Subject Matter Expert
TQ
Threshold Quantity
UFL
Upper Flammable Limit
UK
United Kingdom
US
United States
UST
Underground Storage Tank

GLOSSARY

Acute Toxicity
The adverse (acute) effects resulting from a single dose or exposure to a substance. Importance: Ordinarily used to denote effects in experimental animals.
Asset integrity
A PSM program element involving work activities that help ensure that equipment is properly designed, installed in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for purpose over its life cycle. Also see asset integrity and reliability.
Atmospheric Storage Tank
A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pressure and 0.5 psig (3.45kPa gage).
Boiling-Liquid-Expanding-Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)
A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.
Bow Tie Diagram
A diagram for visualizing the types of preventive and mitigative barriers which can be used to manage risk. These barriers are drawn with the threats on the left, the unwanted event at the center, and the consequences on the right, representing the flow of the hazardous materials or energies through its barriers to its destination. The hazards or threats can be proactively addressed on the left with specific barriers (safeguards, layers of protection) to help prevent a hazardous event from occurring; barriers reacting to the event to help reduce the event's consequences are shown on the right.
Checklist Analysis
A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more pre-prepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
Combustible Dust
Any finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or smaller in diameter (material passing through a U.S. No. 40 standard sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard when dispersed and ignited in air or other gaseous oxidizer.
Conduct of Operations (COO)
The embodiment of an organization's values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization’s risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.
Consequence
The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.
Consequence Analysis
The analysis of the expected effects of incident outcome cases, independent of frequency or probability.
Dispersion Models
Mathematical models that characterize the transport of toxic/flammable materials released to the air and/or the water.
Domino Effects
The triggering of secondary events, such as toxic releases, by a primary event, such as an explosion, such that the result is an increase in consequences or area of an effect zone. Generally only considered when a significant escalation of the original incident results.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
A system of guidelines for airborne concentrations of toxic materials prepared by the AIHA. For example, ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability to take protective action.
Event Tree Analysis
A method used for modeling the propagation of an initiating event through the sequence of possible incident outcomes. The event is represented graphically by a tree with branches from the initiating cause through the success or failure of independent protection layers.
Explosion
A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
A hazard identification technique in which all known failure modes of components or features of a system are considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.
Fault Tree Analysis
A method used to analyze graphically the failure logic of a given event, to identify various failure scenarios (called cut-sets), and to support the probabilistic estimation of the frequency of the event.
F-N Curve
A plot of cumulative frequency versus consequences (often expressed as number of fatalities).
Flammable Liquids
Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below 100 °F (37.8 °C), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100°F (37.8 °C), as determined by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73 °F (22.8 °C) and boiling points below 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73°F (22.8 °C) and boiling points at or above 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73 °F (22.8 °C), but below 100 °F (37.8 °C). (NFPA 30).
Frequency
Number of occurrences of an event per unit time (e.g., 1 event in 1000 yr. = 1 × 10−3 events/yr.).
Frequency Modeling
Development of numerical estimates of the likelihood of an event occurring.
Hazard
An inherent chemical or physical characteristic that has the potential for causing damage to people, property, or the environment.
Hazard Analysis
The identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and usually the estimation of the consequences.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
A systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards
Hazard Identification
The inventorying of material, system, process and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences through the occurrence of an incident.
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)
A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization’s risk tolerance.
Hot Work
Any operation that uses flames or can produce sparks (e.g., welding).
Impact
A measure of the ultimate loss and harm of a loss event. Impact may be expressed in terms of numbers of injuries and/or fatalities, extent of environmental damage and/or magnitude of losses such as property damage, material loss, lost production, market share loss, and recovery costs.
Inertion
A technique by which a combustible mixture is rendered non-ignitable by addition of an inert gas or a noncombustible dust.
Incident
An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage to the environment, or asset/business losses. Such events include fires, explosions, releases of toxic or otherwise harmful substances, and so forth.
Independent Protection Layer (IPL)
A device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to the undesired consequence without being adversely affected by the initiating event or the action of any other protection layer associated with the scenario. A protection layer meets the requirements of being an IPL when it is designed and managed to achieve the following seven core attributes: Independent; Functional; Integrity; Reliable; Validated, Maintained and Audited; Access Security; and Management of Change
Individual Risk
The risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. This includes the nature of the injury to the individual, the likelihood of the injury occurring, and the time period over which the injury might occur.
Inherent Safety
A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations used in the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is permanent and inseparable from the process. Inherently safer technology (IST) is also used interchangeably with inherent safety in the book.
Inherently Safer Design
A way of thinking about the design of chemical processes and plants that focuses on the elimination or reduction of hazards, rather than on their management and control.
Interlock
A protective response which is initiated by an out-of-limit process condition. Instrument which will not allow one part of a process to function unless another part is functioning. A device such as a switch that prevents a piece of equipment from operating when a hazard exists. To join two parts together in such a way that they remain rigidly attached to each other solely by physical interference. A device to prove the physical state of a required condition and to furnish that proof to the primary safety control circuit.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (cause-consequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the initiating event frequency, independent protection layer failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for determining where additional risk reduction or more detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified elsewhere, typically using a scenario-based hazard evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.
Likelihood
A measure of the expected probability or frequency of occurrence of an event. This may be expressed as an event frequency (e.g., events per year), a probability of occurrence during a time interval (e.g., annual probability) or a conditional probability (e.g., probability of occurrence, given that a precursor event has occurred).
Management of Change (MOC)
A system to identify, review and approve all modifications to equipment, procedures, raw materials and processing conditions, other than “replacement in kind,” prior to implementation.
Management System
A formally established set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.
Mechanical Integrity
A management system focused on ensuring that equipment is designed, installed, and maintained to perform the desired function.
Near-Miss
An unplanned sequence of events that could have caused harm or loss if conditions were different or were allowed to progress, but actually did not.
Off-Site Population
People, property, or the environment located outside of the site property line that may be impacted by an on-site incident.
Operating Procedures
Written, step-by-step instructions and information necessary to operate equipment, compiled in one document including operating instructions, process descriptions, operating limits, chemical hazards, and safety equipment requirements.
Organizational Change
Any change in position or responsibility within an organization or any change to an organizational policy or procedure that affects process safety.
Organizational Change Management (OCM)
A method of examining proposed changes in the structure or organization of a company (or unit thereof) to determine whether they may pose a threat to employee or contractor health and safety, the environment, or the surrounding populace.
OSHA Process Safety Management (OSHA PSM)
A U.S. regulatory standard that requires use of a 14-element management system to help prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from processes covered by the regulations 49 CFR 1910.119.
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
A systematic and thorough check of a process prior to the introduction of a highly hazardous chemical to a process. The PSSR must confirm the following: Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications; Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; A process hazard analysis has been performed for new facilities and recommendations and have been resolved or implemented before startup, and modified facilities meet the management of change requirements; and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.
Preventive Maintenance
Maintenance that seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of unplanned shutdowns by establishing a fixed schedule of routine inspection and repairs.
Probit
A random variable with a mean of 5 and a variance of 1, which is used in various effect models. Probit-based models derived from experimental dose-response data, are often used to estimate the health effect that might result based upon the intensity and duration of an exposure to a harmful substance or condition (e.g., exposure to a toxic atmosphere, or a thermal radiation exposure).
Process Hazard Analysis
An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with processes and operations to enable their control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to help prioritize risk reduction.
Process Knowledge Management
A Process Safety Management (PSM) program element that includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and provide information to other PSM program elements. Process safety knowledge primarily consists of written documents such as hazard information, process technology information, and equipment-specific information. Process safety knowledge is the product of this PSM element.
Process Safety Culture
The common set of values, behaviors, and norms at all levels in a facility or in the wider organization that affect process safety.
Process Safety Incident/Event
An event that is potentially catastrophic, i.e., an event involving the release/loss of containment of hazardous materials that can result in large-scale health and environmental consequences.
Process Safety Information (PSI)
Physical, chemical, and toxicological information related to the chemicals, process, and equipment. It is used to document the configuration of a process, its characteristics, its limitations, and as data for process hazard analyses.
Process Safety Management (PSM)
A management system that is focused on prevention of, preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility.
Process Safety Management Systems
Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure that barriers to episodic incidents are in place, in use, and effective.
Qualitative Risk Analysis
Based primarily on description and comparison using historical experience and engineering judgment, with little quantification of the hazards, consequences, likelihood, or level of risk.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
The systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and severity of potential incidents associated with a facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques.
Reactive Chemical
A substance that can pose a chemical reactivity hazard by readily oxidizing in air without an ignition source (spontaneously combustible or peroxide forming), initiating or promoting combustion in other materials (oxidizer), reacting with water, or self-reacting (polymerizing, decomposing or rearranging). Initiation of the reaction can be spontaneous, by energy input such as thermal or mechanical energy, or by catalytic action increasing the reaction rate.
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP)
A term originally used by OSHA, stems from the selection and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents.
It involves the application of engineering, operating or maintenance activities derived from engineering knowledge and industry experience based upon the evaluation and analyses of appropriate internal and external standards, applicable codes, technical reports, guidance, or recommended practices or documents of a similar nature. RAGAGEP can be derived from singular or multiple sources and will vary based upon individual facility processes, materials, service, and other engineering considerations.
Responsible Care©
An initiative implemented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) in 1988 to assist in leading chemical processing industry companies in ethical ways that increasingly benefit society, the economy and the environment while adhering to ten key principles.
Risk
A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. A simplified version of this relationship expresses risk as the product of the likelihood and the consequences (i.e., Risk = Consequence × Likelihood) of an incident.
Risk Contour
Lines that connect points of equal risk around the facility (“isorisk” lines).
Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule
EPA's accidental release prevention Rule, which requires covered facilities to prepare, submit, and implement a risk management plan.
Risk Matrix
A tabular approach for presenting risk tolerance criteria, typically involving graduated scales of incident likelihood on the Y-axis and incident consequences on the X-Axis. Each cell in the table (at intersecting values of incident likelihood and incident consequences) represents a particular level of risk.
Risk-Based Process Safety (RBPS)
The Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) PSM system approach that uses risk-based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk-based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.
Risk Tolerance
The maximum level of risk of a particular technical process or activity that an individual or organization accepts to acquire the benefits of the process or activity.
Risk Tolerance Criteria
A predetermined measure of risk used to aid decisions about whether further efforts to reduce the risk are warranted.
Runaway Reactions
A thermally unstable reaction system which exhibits an uncontrolled accelerating rate of reaction leading to rapid increases in temperature and pressure.
Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
A system composed of sensors, logic servers, and final control elements for the purpose of taking the process to a safe state when predetermined conditions are violated.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
A separate and independent combination of sensors, logic solvers, final elements, and support systems that are designed and managed to achieve a specified safety integrity level. A SIS may implement one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs).
Safeguards or Protective Features
Any device, system, or action that either interrupts the chain of events following an initiating event or that mitigates the consequences. A safeguard can be an engineered system or an administrative control. Not all safeguards meet the requirements of an IPL.
Scenario
A detailed description of an unplanned event or incident sequence that results in a loss event and its associated impacts, including the success or failure of safeguards involved in the incident sequence.
Semi-Quantitative Risk Analysis
Risk analysis methodology that includes some degree of quantification of consequence, likelihood, and/or risk level.
Societal Risk
A measure of risk to a group of people. It is most often expressed in terms of the frequency distribution of multiple casualty events.
Standards
The PSM program element, Compliance with Standards, that helps identify, develop, acquire, evaluate, disseminate, and provide access to applicable standards, codes, regulations, and laws that affect a facility and/or the process safety requirements applicable to a facility. More generally, standards also refer to requirements promulgated by regulators, professional or industry-sponsored organizations, companies, or other groups that apply to the design and implementation of management systems, design and operation of process equipment, or similar activities.
Threshold Limit Value (TLV)
The maximum exposure concentration recommended by the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) for long term exposures.
Threshold Limit Value-Time-Weighted Average (TLV-TWA)
The time-weighted average concentration limit for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect. Developed by the ACGIH.
Toxicity
The quality, state, or degree to which a substance is poisonous and/or may chemically produce an injurious or deadly effect upon introduction into a living organism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Chemical Center for Process Safety (CCPS) thanks all of the members of the Guide for Making Acute Risk Decisions Subcommittee for providing technical guidance in the preparation of this book. CCPS also expresses its appreciation to the members of the Technical Steering Committee for their advice and support.

The co-chairs of the Subcommittee were Fred Henselwood of Nova Chemicals and Jeff Stawicki of Lubrizol. The CCPS staff consultant was David Belonger.

The Subcommittee had the following key contributing members:

Christopher Buehler Exponent
Sorin Dan Nova Chemicals
Elizabeth Lutostansky Air Products
Robin Pitblado DNV GL, (retired)
Martin Timm Praxair
Florine Vincik BASF

The following members also supported this project:

Seshu Dharavaram (Corteva); Derek Miller (Air Products); John Traynor (Evonik); Eric Peterson (MMI Engineering);

The collective industrial experience and know-how of the subcommittee members plus these individuals makes this book especially valuable to engineers who develop and manage process safety programs and management systems, including the identification of the competencies needed to create and maintain these systems.

The book committee wishes to express their appreciation to Albert Ness of CCPS his contributions in writing this book for publication.

Before publication, all CCPS books are subjected to a thorough peer review process. CCPS gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and suggestions of the peer reviewers. Their work enhanced the accuracy and clarity of these guidelines.

Peer Reviewers:

Anne Bartelsman Marathon Petroleum
Denise Chastain-Knight Exida
Palaniappan Chidambaram DuPont
Christopher F. Conlan National Grid
Georges Melham ioMosaic

Although the peer reviewers have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse this book and were not shown the final manuscript before its release.

PREFACE

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) was created by the AIChE in 1985 after the chemical disasters in Mexico City, Mexico, and Bhopal, India. The CCPS is chartered to develop and disseminate technical information for use in the prevention of major chemical accidents. The Center is supported by more than 200 chemical process industries (CPI) sponsors who provide the necessary funding and professional guidance to its technical committees. The major product of CCPS activities has been a series of guidelines to assist those implementing various elements of a process safety and risk management system. This book is part of that series.