Details

Why Counterinsurgency Fails

The US in Iraq and Afghanistan

von: Dennis de Tray
64,19 €
Verlag:	Palgrave Pivot
Format:	PDF
Veröffentl.:	22.09.2018
ISBN/EAN:	9783319979939
Sprache:	englisch

In den Warenkorb

Als Gutschein

Dieses eBook enthält ein Wasserzeichen.

Beschreibungen

Titelbeschreibung

<p>This book examines why the U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed and presents a solution for future counterinsurgency campaigns that was developed and tested in Afghanistan in the hope that it will spark a conversation that will shape the next counterinsurgency war to U.S. advantage. The author argues that both development assistance and counterinsurgency campaigns - which often go hand in hand -  overwhelm weak states with too much money, too many projects, and too many consultants, leading to weaker rather than stronger governments. The solution proposed, was initially developed by David Petraeus but never effectively implemented. Using an insider's perspective, this volume explains the details of this solution and the problem with its mis-implementation in Afghanistan.</p>

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Chapter 1: How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq<div><br></div><div>Chapter 2: Reflections on Iraq, 2008</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 3: On to Afghanistan</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 4: Reflections on Afghanistan</div><div><br></div><div>Chapter 5: Postscript, 2008: Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed</div>

Autorenportrait

<b>Dennis de Tray</b> is Senior Non-Resident Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Principal at the Results for Development Institute, both in Washington, D.C.

Back cover copy

This book explains how and why the US lost the Iraq and Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Wars and the Vietnam War and sets out a proposal for winning the next insurgency, one field-tested on a small scale in Afghanistan. The author discusses his time with the US Army, first in Iraq as a member of the H.R. McMaster–led Governance Assessment Team established by David Petraeus. He then moves to his work with the 173rd Airborne in Afghanistan, describing the counterinsurgency program he developed with the 173rd and its early successes. The book concludes by reflecting back on the author’s earlier experience, asking the question, have subsequent events changed his views? <div><br></div><b>Dennis de Tray</b> is Senior Non-Resident Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Principal at the Results for Development Institute, Washington, D.C. <div><br></div>

Sonderbeitrag

<p>Presents a solution for failed US counterinsurgency campaigns, developed and tested in Afghanistan</p><p>Analyzed how David Petraeus's counterinsurgency policy is correct in principle but never effectively implemented</p><p>Explains how the failed counterinsurgency policy mirrors the problems the international development community has encountered in fragile states</p>